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Where the Past Was, There History
Shall Be
Benjamin, Marx, and the “Tradition of the Oppressed”
Sami Khatib
“How to preserve the radical negativity of the
revolutionary event? How to transmit the
amnesiac rupture within history – to initiate a
tradition of the impossibility of tradition? Our
contemporary obsession with anti-monuments …
begins right here. Failing to keep pace with the
events, revolutionary artifacts became instantly
obsolete, thus needing to be destroyed, and the
destruction in turn to be commemorated,
sacralized, and eternalized, the ruins carefully




1 In  his  influential  essay  ‘Socialism:  Utopian and Scientific’  from 1880,  Engels  deemed
tradition “a  great  retarding force,”  “the vis  inertiae of  history.” 2 This  negative view
became the dominant version of historical materialism’s take on tradition. Already in The 
Poverty  of  Philosophy (1847),  Marx  laid  out  the  foundation  of  what  later  became  the
historical materialist concept of history: 
After the triumph of the bourgeoisie there was no longer any question of the good
or the bad side of  feudalism. The bourgeoisie took possession of  the productive
forces  it  had  developed  under  feudalism.  All  the  old  economic  forms,  the
corresponding civil relations, the political system which was the official expression
of the old civil society, were smashed.3
2 This  assertion  is  not  simply  descriptive  but  politically  emphatic  and  affirmative.
Consequently, Marx acknowledged the revolutionary function of the bourgeois class: “As
Where the Past Was, There History Shall Be
Anthropology & Materialism, Special Issue | I | 2017
1
the  main  thing  is  not  to  be  deprived  of  the  fruits  of  civilisation,  of  the  acquired
productive forces, the traditional forms in which they were produced must be smashed.”4
As the ‘fruits of civilisation’ are only employed yet not exceeded by (or identical with)
bourgeois society, the proletarian revolution could still be envisaged as the heir, however
revolutionary,  of  these  fruits.  In  this  vein,  in  the  Manifesto  of  the  Communist  Party
(1847/48), Marx and Engels famously celebrated the task of the bourgeoisie as that of
mercilessly liquefying the social relations of feudalism: “All that is solid melts into air, all
that is holy is profaned”.5 The proletariat and its revolutionary mission takes its cue from
the  revolutionary  thrust  of  the  dawn  of  the  early  bourgeois  age,  radicalising  the
disintegrating dynamic of capitalism, rooting out both the remainders of feudal society
and the newly established socio-political forms of bourgeois society.
3 If tradition is the compliance with communal customs, passed on from an undefined past,
tradition can only become an integral element of capitalist society once it is relegated to
the limited fields of culture and religion. Although capitalism and its new ruling class, the
bourgeoisie,  “cannot  exist  without  constantly  revolutionising  the  instruments  of
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations
of  society,”6 the  compartmentalised  domains  of  religion  and  culture  allow  for  a
conservative stance on ‘tradition’, which is, as it were, a bourgeois invention. Tradition as
a  bourgeois  concept  has  its  assigned  place  outside  of  the  technological  and  social
revolutions of the sphere of productive forces. That is to say, in the age of its bourgeois
reproducibility,  tradition  is  not  per  se  ‘conservative’;  rather,  it  lends  its  ‘retarding’
(Engels) force to a project that is both affirmative and negative. While creating cultural
meaning and legitimacy, it promises not to change current relations of production which
are  constantly  under  pressure  from  the  transformative  field  of  productive  forces.
Tradition allows for the fantasy that, in a world in which ‘all that is solid melts into air’, a
limited district of bourgeois life could be exempted from radical change, and harmonised
with the existing capitalist relations of production. Consequently, the political project of
changing  the  relations  of  production,  allowing  for  the  collective  access  to  property
beyond private property, appears counter-traditional. As Marx and Engels succinctly put
it:  “The Communist  revolution is  the  most  radical  rupture  with traditional  property
relations;  no  wonder  that  its  development  involved  the  most  radical  rupture  with
traditional  ideas.”7 Nevertheless,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  precisely  the  history  of  class
struggle and struggles against  oppression that  can become a source of  emancipatory
tradition. However, from a bourgeois ‘conservative’ perspective, the realm of tradition,
traditional values and practices are defined as a reified, albeit limited zone of continuity
capable of withstanding the revolutionising force of capitalist modernisation. Benjamin’s
later critique of the bourgeois concept of Kulturgüter, “cultural treasures” (SW 4, 391) and
“cultural history” (SW 3, 268), will engage with this fantasy and its socialist variants. If
cultural history’s project is to “augment the weight of the treasure accumulating on the
back of humanity,” a revolutionary stance has to rely on modernity’s destructive forces in
order to gain “the strength to shake off this burden so as to take control of it” (ibid.).8
4 Marx and Engels’ attack on tradition chimes with Benjamin’s effort – one century later –
to refute the bourgeois idea of cultural history and its so-called ‘cultural treasures’.9 A
crucial difference, however, cannot be missed: Benjamin’s concept of history does not
rely on the idea that the dialectics of the (‘retarding’) relations of production, and the
(‘accelerating’)  productive  forces  would  inevitably  lead  to  social  revolution.  Marx’s
processual  concept  of  historical  materialism  is  not  to  be  mistaken  for  economic
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automatism. However, his famous formulation from A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy (1859) seems to locate the communist project of overcoming capitalism on the
winning side of world history. 
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come
into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the
same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of
which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive
forces  these  relations  turn  into  their  fetters.  Then  begins  an  era  of  social
revolution.  The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the
transformation  of  the  whole  immense  superstructure.  In  studying  such
transformations  it  is  always  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  material
transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined
with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or
philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this
conflict and fight it out.10
5 The outcome of this fight was not guaranteed in Marx’s time either.  When Benjamin
wrote his last text, the theses “On the Concept of History” (1940) this fight was lost – at
least for Benjamin and his generation.
 
II. Dialectics of Tradition
6 Instead of  revoking his  Marxism,  Benjamin proposes a different reading of  historical
materialism, resulting in a radical revision of vulgar Marxism and, to a lesser degree,
Marx’s processual concept of history. From a non-defeatist position of defeat, Benjamin
conceives of history not as a progressive flow of “homogeneous, empty time” (SW 4, 395),
but  as  an anachronic  constellation of  past  and present,  shot  through with sparks  of
messianic time. Benjamin calls these short-circuits of past and present Jetztzeit, “now-
time” (SW 4, 395). According to this anti-evolutionary concept of history, the past is never
simply  gone;  it  can  never  be  fully  historicised  unless  it  is  recalled  –  cited  in  a
revolutionary way. Only if politics has the capacity to anticipate the kairos, the ‘opportune
moment’  for  a  “tiger’s  leap  into  the  past,”  can  “the  dialectical  leap”  that  “Marx
understood as revolution” interrupt the catastrophic course of history (SW 4, 395). In this
way, history, historiography, and revolutionary action are inextricably intertwined; an
allegedly neutral perspective, detached from political struggles, only leads to “‘empathy
with the victor’” (SW 4, 406). And “the rulers at any time,” as Benjamin reminds us, “are
the heirs of all those who have been victorious throughout history” (SW 4, 406). Against
this  form of  victors’  history,  be  it  historicist,  progressivist  or  evolutionist,  Benjamin
argues for a truly historical concept of history, aiming at the revolutionary encounter of
past and present, accessible only for “the struggling, oppressed class” (SW 4, 394). In this
sense, the task of the materialist historiographer is both radically partisan and universal:
“The history-writing subject is, properly, that part of humanity whose solidarity embraces
all the oppressed. It is the part which can take the greatest theoretical risks because, in
practical terms, it has the least to lose” (SW 4, 404).11
7 The medium in which the present is connected to all lost causes and struggles of those
who literally and metaphorically have lost their histories is called the ‘tradition of the
oppressed’.  Against  common  views  of  historical  materialism,  Benjamin  proposes  a
dialectical understanding of the notion of tradition in his preparatory notes for the theses
‘On the Concept of History’. 
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(Basic aporia: “Tradition as the discontinuum of the past in contradiction to history
as  the  continuum  of  events.”  –  “It  may  be  that  the  continuum  of  tradition  is
semblance  [Schein].  But  then  precisely  the  persistence  of  this  semblance  of
persistence provides it with continuity.”)
(Basic  aporia:  “The history of  the oppressed is  a  discontinuum.” –  “The task of
history is to get hold of the tradition of the oppressed.”) 
More on these aporias:  “The continuum of history is the one of the oppressors.
Whereas the idea [Vorstellung] of the continuum levels everything to the ground,
the idea [Vorstellung] of the discontinuum is the foundation of real tradition.”
[crossed out passage:]
What  characterizes  revolutionary  classes  at  the  moment  of  their  action  is  the
consciousness of historical discontinuity. On the other hand, however, the class’s
revolutionary  action  is  most  closely  related  to  the  class’s  concept  (not  only  of
coming history but also) of past history. This is only an apparent contradiction:
bridging  the  gap  of  two  millennia  the  French  Revolution  drew  on  the  Roman
Republic. (GS I, 1236)12
8 What Benjamin addresses  here in terms of  aporias  relates  back to  the contradictory
meaning of tradition. As the proverb has it, ‘tradition is not to preserve the ashes but to
pass on the flame.’ Its root, the Latin verb tradere, conveys a variety of meanings, the most
common of which is to hand down, to transmit, to pass on. However, tradere also denotes
surrender,  giving away,  betrayal.  This last meaning could give us a first  hint of  how
Benjamin  conceives  of  the  ‘tradition  of  the  oppressed’.  Tradition  does  not  establish
continuity through transmission but is a discontinuum fissured by lack, privation and
betrayal.  However,  he  claims  that  the  fractured  medium  of  the  ‘tradition  of  the
oppressed’ is not only negative, for history also transmits a redemptive messianic force.
But  how are  we to  detect  this  force,  and who is  ‘we’  in  this  case?  In  another  note
Benjamin writes:
The historical materialist who investigates the structure of history performs, in his
way,  a sort of  spectrum analysis.  Just  as a physicist  determines the presence of
ultraviolet light in the solar spectrum, so the historical materialist determines the
presence  of  a  messianic  force  in  history.  Whoever  wishes  to  know  what  the
situation of  a  “redeemed humanity” [erlöste  Menschheit]  might  actually  be,  what
conditions are required for the development of  such a situation,  and when this
development  can  be  expected  to  occur,  poses  questions  to  which  there  are  no
answers. He might just as well seek to know the color of ultraviolet rays. (SW 4, 402)
9 Such messianic spectral analysis may bring an invisible colour to the fore. If the light of
history also transmits messianic rays, then the medium in which they are imparted and
discontinuously  passed  on  is  the  ‘tradition  of  the  oppressed’.  This  medium  is  not
continuous, transparent and neutral but discontinuous, opaque and politically partisan –
its texture is woven out of struggles, empty-spots and disjointed elements, which cannot
be  represented  in  one  transmittable  image  or  inscribed  into  one  multifaceted  yet
coherent  world-history.  In  this  sense,  the  metaphor  of  continuous  rays  might  be
misleading;  it  does  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  in  the  final  version  of  the  ‘Theses’
Benjamin  limits  his  messianic  imagery  to  “splinters of  messianic  time”  (SW 4,  397). 
Moreover, with the messianic force in history, the boundaries of natural science’s image-
space are reached. For Benjamin’s historical materialist cannot count on scientific laws.
Unlike a physicist, he or she has no measurement at hand to pursue a messianic spectral
analysis  of  history.  The  only  feature  borrowed  from  natural  science  concerns  its
experimental character. Throughout the notes of the ‘Theses’, Benjamin acknowledges
the  tentative  approach  of  his  version  of  historical  materialism.  However,  this
experimental character has a politically firm guiding structure. For “[w]ithout some sort
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of  assay  [Prüfung]  of  the  classless  society,  there  is  only  a  historical  forgery  [
Geschichtsklitterung] of the past” (SW 4, 407).13 Benjamin’s experimental ‘Theses’ borrow
their language and imagery from various fields of knowledge, be it Marxism, theology,
surrealism, literary criticism or natural science. However, the fractured medium in which
history will have been told is bound to a partisan experience and perspective. For only
the ‘tradition of the oppressed’ imparts a genuinely historical image of the past. This is
why  Benjamin  remains  a  fierce  critic  of  the  humanist  idea  of  cultural  heritage  and
commemoration; the latter always represents a reified image of the past, seen from the
perspective of victor’s of history, aiming at neutralising the messianic force in history. 
10 In this sense, Benjamin’s peculiar version of historical materialism is not limited to an
alternative  or  ‘messianic’  historiography.  Within  the  discontinuous  medium  of  the
‘tradition of the oppressed’, struggles of the past are not diachronically strung together
but synchronistically short-circuited. Therefore, past struggles cannot be narrated like a
chronological  story;  they can only be cited in the present by conjuring fragments of
history’s “weak messianic power” – a Kraft, force “on which the past has a claim” (SW 4,
389). This conjuring or channelling, however, cannot intentionally be enforced. It is only
by  way  of  a  messianic  openness  beyond  the  dichotomies  of  activity  and  passivity,
intentional  acting  and  non-intentional  meditation,  that  a  radically  partisan  and
politically involved collective – the ‘struggling, oppressed class’ – can account for this
weak messianic force by taking up what the latter addresses. There is no guarantee that
the past’s claim is taken up by its belated addressee.
 
III. The Modality of Affective Time
11 In the theses “On the Concept of History”, Benjamin demonstrates how political action
retroactively intervenes in the modality of each present’s unfulfilled past. The site of this
retroaction is class struggle.
Class struggle, which for a historian schooled in Marx is always in evidence, is a
fight  for  the  crude  and material  things  without  which  no  refined and spiritual
things could exist. But these latter things, which are present in class struggle, are
not present as a vision of spoils that fall to the victor. They are alive in this struggle
as confidence, courage, humor, cunning, and fortitude, and have effects that reach
far back into the past. (SW 4, 390)
12 In  other  words,  through  virtues  like  ‘confidence,  courage,  humour,  cunning,  and
fortitude’ the current class struggle can modify its relation to the past. Besides being a
struggle for the ‘crude and material things’, class struggle also imparts a medium through
which lost struggles of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’ are present in current struggles.
And vice versa the retroactive effect that the present has on the past corresponds to a
claim that the past has on the present. These anachronic modifications of the relation of past
and present cannot be registered objectively but can only be collectively channelled in the
uneven course of class struggle. Referring to the Spartakusbund of Rosa Luxemburg and
Karl Liebknecht, Benjamin affirms the collective affect of past failed revolutions in terms
of “hatred” and the “spirit of sacrifice” “for both are nourished by the image of enslaved
ancestors rather than by the ideal of liberated grandchildren” (SW 4, 394). In this sense,
only  “the  struggling,  oppressed  class”  is  “the  avenger  that  completes  the  task  of
liberation in the name of generations of the downtrodden” (SW 4, 395). These negative
affects  of  the  past,  however  powerless  and  defeated  they  may  be,  already  had  a
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transformative effect on their own past and still reverberate in our present. Their echoes
are channelled through the affective medium of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’. Rather
than fetishising the image of failed struggles, as “left-wing melancholy” (SW 2.2, 425)
would do, this partisan tradition actualises a weak potentiality of past failures in order to
change the modality of the present. It is not that the present historicises and changes the
past according its own demands but,  on the contrary,  the past puts the present into
perspective,  relativises  and  deconstructs  the  image  of  the  present  as  the  necessary
outcome of history. 
13 Benjamin’s take on revenge is not surprising, given his reading of Marx. In a speech from
1856, Marx understood non-reciprocal revenge as a counter-factual affect and integral
force of the historical-materialist concept of history. 
I know the heroic struggles the English working class have gone through since the
middle of the last century – struggles less glorious, because they are shrouded in
obscurity, and burked by the middleclass historian. To revenge the misdeeds of the
ruling class, there existed in the middle ages, in Germany, a secret tribunal, called
the “Vehmgericht.” If a red cross was seen marked on a house, people knew that its
owner was doomed by the “Vehm.” All the houses of Europe are now marked with
the mysterious red cross.14
14 Such a secret tribunal has no formal or formalisable legal code, it does not comply with
the rules of official world history – and neither does revolution which relies on hidden
‘irregular’ forces, elf- or kobold-like figures such as “Robin Goodfellow”, “the old mole”15
who  digs  underground  time-tunnels  where  the  ruling  classes’  history  denies
revolutionary justice. Structurally similar, the act of revolution and the collective affect of
revenge can bridge hundreds of years, short-circuiting disparate and seemingly unrelated
events. Nothing could be further from later vulgar Marxist and social democratic beliefs
in  revolution  as  the  quasi-automatic  mechanism  of  progressive  world  history.  The
temporal form of extra-legal historical justice cannot be mapped from the perspective of
the  law and modern state  violence:  the  former is  uneven and contracted,  the  latter
proceeds  in  “homogeneous,  empty time” (SW 4,  395).  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Marx’s
example of the medieval ‘Vehmgericht’ is not to be mistaken for a normative justification
of  non-normative  acts.  In  advance,  no  universalisable  guarantee  can  be  given  as  to
whether such acts are just or, as Benjamin’s earlier essay “Critique of Violence” (1921)
put it, manifest “divine violence” as the “crowd’s divine judgment on a criminal” (SW 1,
252). Benjamin is thus careful not to not affirm all kinds of collective pathemata, passions,
and  affects.  Rather,  he  demonstrates  the  difference  of  their  images,  modalities  and
temporalities.
15 The affective medium of past struggles imparts a non-linear temporality irreducible to
the specific characteristics of its leaders or its historicisable events. In a radical sense,
there is nothing to be learnt from past failures,  no solace to be found, no instructive
narrative to be told, no future utopia to be envisaged, no ideology to be distilled. Within
the discontinuum of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’, the failed slave rebellion of ancient
Spartacus, and the failed Spartacist uprising of 1919 have only one thing in common:
their attempt to interrupt the course of oppressive history. The fractured medium that
connects and separates these disparate struggles only transmits its own mediacy – not in
order to museumise past failures, but to set them free – as history. Put differently, if the
historical materialist’s task of “blast[ing] open the continuum of history” (SW 4, 396) only
comes into perspective from within class  struggle,  then the disruptive “fight for the
crude and material things” (SW 4, 390) is the affective medium that enables a properly
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historical perspective  on  the  past  (in  contradistinction  from historicist  or  historical-
metaphysical concepts of history). But how can the past be changed in this medium?
16 Slavoj  Žižek  rightly  points  out  that  Benjamin’s  anti-historicist  stance  relies  on  a
“revolutionary Act that will  […] retroactively realize the crushed longings of all  past,
failed revolutionary attempts.”16 Put differently,  only a revolutionary act within class
struggle can fully actualise and realise a past that has not yet existed. From a historical
perspective, the past is still ‘ahead’ of us. 
What  this  means  is  that,  in  a  properly  historical  perspective  as  opposed  to
evolutionist historicism, the past is not simply past, but bears within it its proper
utopian  promise  of  a  future  Redemption:  in  order  to  understand  a  past  epoch
properly, it is not sufficient to take into account the historical conditions out of
which it grew – one has also to take into account the utopian hopes of a Future that
were betrayed and crushed by it – that which was ‘negated’, that which did not
happen – so that the past historical reality was the way it was.17 
17 Understood in this way, messianic redemption is not about some apocalyptic intrusion
from ‘outside’ (a divine intervention into human affairs) but about the restoring (or, in
more  theological  terms,  ‘restitutio  in  integrum’  or  ‘tikkun’)  of  the  past’s  repressed
potentialities. This restoration is not conservative but opening: it ex-poses the present as
changeable. The task is not to rewrite history from the perspective of the present, but to
destabilise the seemingly solid ground of the present as historical outcome of the past.
To put it in even clearer terms: when we say the present redeems the past itself,
that the past itself contained signs which pointed towards the present, we are not
making a historicist-relativist statement about how there is no ‘objective’ history;
how we always interpret the past from our present horizon of understanding; how,
in defining past epochs, we always – consciously or not – imply our present point of
view. What we are claiming [of Benjamin, S.K.] is something more radical: what the
proper  historical stance  (as  opposed  to  historicism)  ‘relativizes’  is  not  the  past
(always distorted by our present point of view) but, paradoxically, the present itself –
our present can be conceived only as the outcome (not only of what happened in
the past, but also) of the crushed potentials for the future that were contained in
the past.18
18 Žižek’s reading captures the radical kernel of Benjamin’s ‘Theses’. The latter’s inherently
‘theological’  or  ‘messianic’  dimension does  not  contradict  or  compromise its  Marxist
impulse.  Rather,  the displaced language of theology functions here as a corrective of
scientific Marxism to flesh out the revolutionary core of a genuinely historical-materialist
concept  of  history  vis-à-vis  historicist,  evolutionist  or  metaphysical  philosophies  of
history,  which either eternalise or de-historicise the past.  The past is  never ‘just out
there’ – it is not a given, a fait accompli, since it is never ontologically fully constituted.
Without its hidden, repressed, or crushed potentialities,  the past never arrives at the
point where it can become history in its full sense.
19 But how can the present and its current political struggles redeem the past and make it
history? An ‘act’ is never a transparent, consciously and voluntarily performed action
that can be appropriated by a certain subject. Rather, “in an authentic act, the highest
freedom coincides with the utmost passivity, with a reduction to a lifeless automaton who
blindly performs its gestures.”19 The act of retroactively changing the present’s relation
to the past is such an act in which radical activity (class struggle) and utmost passivity
(the weak messianic force) coincide. Paradoxically, the gestures of such passive-active acts
are performed by subjects who cannot fully own or totalise their ‘own’ acts. The gestures
that redeem the past are not at the disposal of some self-identical subject of history.
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Benjamin’s key term to theorise the gestures of such active-passive acts is ‘citation’: the
texture of a particular past is cited/redeemed by a particular present. However, there is
no author of history to sign the citation. We will later return to this point in the context
of Benjamin’s reading of Marx.
20 For the moment let us concentrate on how Benjamin’s ‘Theses’ interweave the messianic
citability of the past with its narratibility and transmittability.  In the third thesis he
writes:
The  chronicler  who  narrates  events  without  distinguishing  between  major  and
minor ones acts in accord with the following truth: nothing that has ever happened
should  be  regarded  as  lost  to  history.  Of  course  only  a  redeemed  mankind  is
granted the fullness of its past-which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its
past become citable in all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes a citation
a l’ordre du jour. And that day is Judgment Day. (SW 4, 390)
21 The messianic (universal and integral) citability of the past will have become possible
only for a ‘redeemed mankind’. The future past of messianic citability, however, already
changes the modality of citing the past in the unredeemed present. If ‘nothing that has
ever happened should be regarded as lost to history’, as Benjamin sums up the task of the
pre-modern chronicler, then the modern historian too cannot simply dispose of his or her
past and treat it as completed. The past is incomplete, for only the present holds the key
to complete (that is, to redeem) the past by citing it. For an unredeemed mankind this
citation is not possible at any time but only at a very particular moment when the “true
image of the past flits by” (SW 4, 390). In other words, an unredeemed mankind can miss
the “secret agreement between past generations and the present one” (SW 4, 390), and
lose its ability to quote the past in a redemptive way. The citability of the past is not
subject  to  the  voluntary  demands  and  interests  of  the  present.  Rather,  the  secret
agreement – the sympathy and synchronicity – of a particular present and a particular
fragment  of  the  past  only  happens  in  a  zone  of  indistinction  between  activity  and
passivity, cognition and affection, collective dreaming and awaking, conscious and “not-
yet-conscious knowledge of what has been” (AP, N 1,9). We will later see how Benjamin
can  theorise  this  peculiar  short-circuit  of  (re)cognisability  and  redeemability,
epistomology and ontology.
22 For the moment,  let us follow the intertwinement of collective affects and the past’s
redeemability.  Werner  Hamacher  is  right  when  he  argues  that  Benjamin’s  ‘Theses’
uncover “the temporal structure of the political affect.”20 The two types of political affect,
the  negative  avenging  and  the  positive  encouraging  one,  have  temporal  effects
connecting political struggles of the past and the present. The retroactive effects of present
struggles and the after-history of past struggles intersect in what Benjamin calls ‘weak
messianic  power  (Kraft)’  –  a  counter-hegemonic  undercurrent  within  the  layers  of
dominant history, experienced only by those who recognise themselves as intended by it.
This  recognition,  however,  is  not  timeless-contemplative  but  temporal-affective;  its
discontinuous medium is connected to the ‘tradition of the oppressed’.  The individual
entry  point  to  this  collective  medium,  which  could  channel  and  register  the  ‘weak
messianic power’ of the past, is to be found in moments of happiness. As Benjamin writes
in the second thesis: “the image of happiness we cherish is thoroughly colored by the
time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us” (SW 4, 389). The modality
of how past and present relate to each other is not objective or factual but experienced
and hence changed in an affective way, channelled through affective time. Cognition and
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affect, potentiality and actuality, historical time and political struggle intersect here in a
peculiar way. As Hamacher comments:
The thesis demonstrates that cognitive acts, determined by the micro-structure of
the affective time, are political operations. The cognition at stake here, however, is
the cognition of happiness. Happiness never is experienced in a present without
this  present  relating  to  that  which  has  been  (Gewesenes).  It  is  not,  however,
experienced on a past reality, but on the irrealis of its non-actualised possibility.21
23 The affective time of missed possibilities of the past cannot be mapped by a teleological
understanding of the relation of actus and potentia.  Happiness is not a goal – it is not
grounded in the stable presence of an individual affect (the classic liberal ‘pursuit of
happiness’),  but presents the lucky embodiment of affective time. Benjamin’s German
word for happiness, Glück, denotes both the conjuncture of happiness and the disjuncture
of luck.  Luck or fortune is not simply contingency, the lucky conjoining of disparate
‘touches’, but the happy interruption of what has been violently conjoined. It is the a-
teleological opening for new conjunctures. And indeed, as Jonathan Lear comments on
Aristotle and Freud, happiness is “not the ultimate goal of our teleologically organized
strivings, but the ultimate ateleological moment: a chance event going well for us – quite
literally, a lucky break.”22 It is in this profane and a-teleological sense that we should
understand Benjamin’s idea of happiness: as a disruptive break (re)opening “possibilities
for new possibilities”23 that were foreclosed in the past. As Hamacher reminds us, the
German noun for redemption, Er-lösung, also connotes Lösung [release], which is part of
the German word for the strictly prosaic meaning of redemption: Ein-lösung, “a redeeming
[…] of possibilities, which are opened with every life and are missed in every life.”24 This
profane reading of messianic redemption as lucky break and modal change does not only
lay bare the temporal structure of the political affect: it also alludes to the split between
history  and the  past.  Put  differently,  what  affective  time “bridges”  or  “mediates”  is
nothing other than this gap between an unhistoricisable past and history as ontologically
incomplete.
 
IV. From Repression to Repetition
24 In 1954 Jacques Lacan wrote: “History is not the past. History is the past in so far as it is
historicised in the present – historicised in the present because it was lived in the past.”25
This categorical distinction between past (le passé, Vergangenheit) and history (l’histoire,
Geschichte) is also at stake in Marx’s famous article on the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte from 1852.
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not
make  it  under  self-selected  circumstances,  but  under  circumstances  existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.26
25 The  psychoanalytical  name  of  this  nightmare  might  be  trauma.  In  a  historical-
psychoanalytical sense, the past is not simply gone or dead but undead – and that is why it
haunts the present like an Alp, as Marx writes in the German version. An Alp is an elf, a
figure  from  Germanic  mythology  that  was  believed  to  cause  nightmares,  Alpträume
(literally: elf-dreams), by sitting on the chest of the sleeping person. If we transpose this
image to the scene of collective history and read it with Benjamin, we might add that the
‘tradition of all dead generations’ will keep on haunting the present like a nightmare, an
Alptraum, as  long as  its  dead mode of  transmittability represses the ‘tradition of  the
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oppressed’. Even if the experiences of all oppressed traditions are erased and flattened into
the linear representation of ‘victor’s history’, history’s repressed will return in a displaced
scene, in distorted shape – as specters.
26 Benjamin, however, does not affirm this kind of spectrality. In contrast to more recent
accounts – one might think of Derrida’s Specters of Marx27 – he calls for a revolutionary-
messianic cessation of the past’s undeadness. However, if modernity cannot bury its dead,
then the ‘book of history’ can never be closed – unless the claims of the ‘tradition of the
oppressed’ are settled and the past is historicised in the present. Following Hegel and the
young Marx, the precondition for a real burial is a reconciled separation from the past
and its undead specters. For only a “reconciled humanity will take leave of its past – and
one form of reconciliation is cheerfulness”, as Benjamin paraphrases Marx in the Arcades
Project (AP, N 5a,2).28 In order to “take leave of its past cheerfully,” (AP, N 5a,2)29 humanity
has to repeat the past in a comical way. In the same passage from his Contribution to the
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843), Marx writes: “History is thorough, and passes
through many stages when she carries a worn-out form to burial.  The last stage of a
world-historical form is its comedy. The gods of Greece, who had already been mortally
wounded in the Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus, had to die yet again – this time a comic
death – in the dialogues of Lucian.”30 Whereas Marx’s earlier text from 1843 still draws on
a Hegelian sequence of original  tragedy and comical repetition,  the later text on the
Brumaire from 1852, reflecting on the failed revolution of 1848, adds a non-cheerful form
of farcical repetition. In this vein, Marx famously declared:
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the
past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off
all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of
past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In
order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let
the dead bury their dead.31
27 However, as I will argue, the revolutionary task of burying the dead – while realising the
real content of revolution – is also a form of repetition – a non-farcical repetition that
recalls the past’s undeadness in order to let it go. This form of repetition is not about
conjuring up a specter, the repetition of a certain content or the reenactment of past
happenings, but repeats its own attempt to work through the past in order to take leave
of  it  cheerfully.  As  we  will  see,  what  the  younger  Marx  associated  with  comical
cheerfulness,  Heiterkeit,  the  later  Marx  calls  proletarian  revolution.  It  comes  as  no
surprise  that  Benjamin  too  is  well  aware  of  the  coupling  of  comical  repetition  and
revolution. In a note written for his famous essay on “The Work of Art In the Age of
Mechanical  Reproduction”  (1935/36),  he  proposes  to  counter  the  beastly  severity  of
fascism with the cheerfulness,  “Heiterkeit,” of  communism (GS I,  1045).  Revolutionary
cheerfulness  is  not  about  specific  affects  of  the  political  but  about  a  retroactive
intervention in the causal chain of historical events that lead to the farcical repetitions in
the present. In other words, revolutionary repetition is cheerful only insofar as it breaks
with the compulsion to repeat. As we will later see, this sort of cheerful repetition of
history lays bare the temporal structure of the political affect that Hamacher detected in
Benjamin’s theses “On the Concept of History”.
28 With regard to Benjamin, it is the ‘tradition of the oppressed’ that presses for a repetition
of a repressed (and in this sense undead) past in order to take leave of it. The comical
dimension  of  this  repetition,  however,  is  not  simply  uplifting  or  entertaining.  If
repetition is “constitutive of the comic genre as such,”32 as Alenka Zupančič notes, we
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have  to  distinguish  between  two  different  forms  of  repetition.  Relying  on  Marx’s
Brumaire, Zupančič mentions repetition as farce and repetition as proletarian revolution.
And  indeed,  Marx  begins  his  argument  with  the  famous  dictum:  “Hegel  remarks
somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it
were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”33 The farcical
form of repetition is the formula of the failed revolution from 1848 whose revolutionary
imagination came up with “nothing better to do than to parody, now 1789.”34 However,
Marx does  not  categorically  reject  any form of  quoting  from the  past.  He  mentions
“epochs of revolutionary crisis” when its protagonists “anxiously conjure up the spirits of
the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order
to  present the  new  scene  of  world  history  in  this  time-honoured  disguise  and  this
borrowed language.”35 It is worth noting that the lack of tragic authenticity is not Marx’s
concern. He concedes that “the awakening of the dead in those revolutions served the
purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given
task in imagination, not of fleeing from its solution in reality; of finding once more the
spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk about again.”36
29 Benjamin, who read Marx’s Brumaire in the summer of 1938, 37 radicalised this insight
when formulating his famous 14th thesis “On the Concept of History” in 1940:
History  is  the  subject  matter  [Gegenstand]  of  a  construction  whose  site  is  not
homogeneous,  empty  time,  but  time  filled  full  by  now-time  [Jetztzeit].  Thus,  to
Robespierre  ancient  Rome was  a  past  charged  with  now-time,  a  past  which  he
blasted out of the continuum of history.  The French Revolution viewed itself  as
Rome reincarnate.  It  cited ancient Rome exactly the way fashion cites a bygone
mode of dress. Fashion has a nose for the topical [Aktuelle], no matter where it stirs
in the thickets of long ago; it is the tiger's leap into the past. Such a leap, however,
takes place in an arena where the ruling class gives the commands. The same leap
in the open air of history is the dialectical leap Marx understood as revolution. (SW
4, 395)
30 Indeed,  Benjamin’s  concept  of  now-time,  Jetztzeit,  is  not  so  far  from  Marx.  The
revolutionary citation of the past in the present is not to be mistaken for inauthentic
imitations  of  past  revolutions  (‘parody’  or  ‘farce’).  Moreover,  within  the  disruptive
temporality  of  Jetztzeit the  very  distinction  between  historical  authenticity  and
inauthenticity loses its linear evidence: what is copy, what is original – and what comes
first? A citation, as Benjamin comments on Brecht, is never a mere repetition of a text; on
the contrary, the quoted text interrupts the continuity of the present one and thereby
discovers something new: a new insight, situation, context, or task.38 The citability of
Brechtian gestures and, more generally, textual fragments also applies to the texture of
history. “If one looks upon history as a text” (SW 4, 405) – a text that only future readers
are capable of fully deciphering – it is only the particular citability of a certain fragment
of the past at a certain moment that enables the legibility and recognisablity of historical
textures.  The  true  image  of  the  Roman  Republic  flitted  by  in  the  moment  of  its
revolutionary citation in the French Revolution of 1789 – the moment when the true
image of the Roman Republic “attain[ed] to legibility” (AP, N 3,1). Moreover, following
Benjamin’s historical-materialist hermeneutics of historical texts, we can state that the
true image of a past happening only reveals itself as a proper historical event with a certain
delay – after  it  will  have been repeated (‘cited’)  in a  non-farcical  way.  The paradox,
however, is that this historical repetition performs a kind of original repetition – ‘history’
only repeats itself at one certain moment in time (what Benjamin’s Arcades Project calls
“now of recognizability”). In other words, we have to distinguish between a particular
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historical repetition and universal messianic repeatability in a manner that recalls what we
noted earlier about messianic citability in the third thesis “On the Concept of History”. 
Against  conventional  logics,  here  we  are  not  to  abstract  from  particular  historical
repetitions in order to arrive at universal repeatability. And indeed, as Benjamin states in
the  Arcades  Project,  the  historical-materialist  task  is  “to  break  with  vulgar  historical
naturalism” and “to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of
the  total  event  [Totalgeschehens]”  (AP,  N  2,6). In  order  to  grasp  Benjamin’s  counter-
intuitive move fully, we have to presuppose the existence (however weak) of the total
event.  Although  the  messianic  totality  of  all  events  is  logically  prior  to  the
aforementioned congealed crystal, nothing can be deduced from the former. And vice
versa,  totality  is  a  category  that  can  never  be  deduced  from  empirical  reality  or
metaphysical abstractions. The retroactive logic of messianic redemption can be summed
up as follows: the universal messianic repeatability of the past is the structural condition of any
particular historical repetition. It is in this sense that Benjamin’s concepts of Jetztzeit and
citability  bear  witness  to  the  possibility  of  non-farcical  modes  of  repetition.  These
notions, however, only gain their full argumentative thrust when we read them vis-à-vis
the Marxian text. Instead of limiting its critique to the farcical embodiment of the specter
of past revolutions, Marx’s Brumaire provides us with a theory of how the realm of history
is  entered  into  through non-farcical  repetition  –  by  unevenly  working  through past
failures.
 
V. History as Tragedy, Comedy and Farce
31 In  Marx’s  Brumaire,  revolutionary  repetition  is  the  mode  in  which  the  proletarian
revolution works through, and gets rids of the specters of the past. This working through
is uneven, discontinuous, and repetitive. In contrast to bourgeois revolutions,
proletarian revolutions […] criticize themselves constantly,  interrupt themselves
continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order
to  begin  it  afresh,  deride  with  unmerciful  thoroughness  the  inadequacies,
weaknesses  and  paltrinesses  of  their  first  attempts,  seem  to  throw  down  their
adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise
again,  more  gigantic,  before  them,  recoil  ever  and  anon  from  the  indefinite
prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes
all turning back impossible, and the conditions themselves cry out:
Hic Rhodus, hic salta!
Here is the rose, here dance!39
32 Instead of reading this final exclamation in a teleological way, we cannot miss Marx’s
emphasis on the repetitive structure of this kind of revolutionary working through of the
past. The revolutionary leap, saltus, cannot count on historical-metaphysical guarantees.
Rather than arriving at a final more perfect state like in social-democratic fantasies of
socialism, the formula of the proletarian revolution seems much closer to Samuel Beckett:
Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better. The modal leap from failing once to
failing better retroactively changes the parameters of the possible of preceding attempts.
Repetition here  is  both stubbornly  insisting  and retroactively  changing.  As  Zupančič
argues: 
It  is  not  an “empty repetition” as revolution in the service of  perpetuating the
given, but a stubborn attempt to do something against all odds, which, because of
its repetitious character, leaves the realm of the heroic and enters a territory closer
to the comic – not because it keeps failing, but because it keeps insisting.40 
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33 In order to actualise lost potentialities of failed revolutions of the past, we are to repeat
history in this stubbornly insisting manner. Hence, a new failure is never a mere
repetition of a past failure. By virtue of perpetual insistence the act of ‘failing again’
changes something in the very nature of trying. It all comes down to how we understand
the ‘again’ in failing: if every new trying in the present draws on the present (im)perfect
of ‘having failed’, every coming failure actualises the revolutionary impulse of its original
failure and gives it a different twist. Moreover, it is only the act of ‘failing again’ that can
lay  bare  the  non-actualised  potentialities  of  past  failures.  Here,  the  planes  of
epistemology  (our  historiographic  image  of  the  past  as  historia  rerum  gestarum)  and
ontology (the impossible real object of historiography as res gestae) intersect and allow for
a concept of history that bypasses the conventional alternative of either pluralism of
historical narratives or univocity of one hegemonic History with a capital H. Instead of
compulsively repeating the past, the realm of transformative repetition is entered as soon
as the comical repetition of the past gets hold of the true image of the past’s original
tragedy. Seizing this true image does not mean to recognise the past ‘the way it really
was’.  Rather,  “articulating  the  past  historically,”  as  Benjamin  reminds  us, “means
appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger” (SW 4, 391). Setting aside
what the subject matter of such memory could be,41 let me rephrase Benjamin’s insight
with regard to Marx. Seizing the true image of the past as it “flashes up at the moment of
its  recognizability”  (SW  4,  390)  is  nothing  else  than  repeating  the  past  in  its  full
potentiality and actualising the scope of its failures and defeats in the here and now. In
other words, the act of ‘failing again’ and the act of ‘seizing the true image of the past
future’ are actually the same act of transformative repetition, yet seen from different
perspectives. What from an epistemological viewpoint reveals itself as a truth about the
past, realises itself in the actual present by changing the ontology of what has been, and the
modality of what shall be. The impossible object of the past is never simply gone – it will
have been recognised by a present yet to come. It is history’s peculiar temporality of
future past, or futur antérieur, that provides the shifting ground of every new act of trying
and failing. The “logical time” (SW 1, 276) of grasping the true image of what will have been
intervenes in the modality of the present by changing the horizon of the possible.42
34 However,  the logic  of  transformative repetition is  uneven and disruptive.  Despite  its
stubborn insistence, the act of ‘trying again’ carries no guarantee of failing better. The
political danger of missing the true image of the past as it ‘flits by’ may lead to a change
from bad to worse. As we noted earlier with Zupančič: in the case of political struggle and
revolution  as  repetition,  the  comical  cheerful  aspect  is  reduced  to  its  structural
dimension of insistence. Moreover, with Benjamin we might add: the retroactive logic of
transformative repetition can be transmitted only by the ‘tradition of the oppressed’. It is
in this analytical-materialist sense that we may read the motto that Benjamin’s friend
Ernst  Bloch attributed to  Thomas Münzer and the German Peasants’  War:  Geschlagen
ziehen wir nach Haus, unsere Enkel fechten's besser aus. (‘Beaten we are heading home, but
our heirs in battle will fight on’.)43 The stubborn insistence on fighting-on does not simply
repeat the failures of past battles: it even fails at repeating the failures of the past. Calling
on its  heirs  in battle,  the discontinuous tradition of  Thomas Münzer and his  beaten
peasant army transmits “the image of enslaved ancestors rather than […] the ideal of
liberated grandchildren” (SW 4, 394). However, even this image of defeat is unstable – it
fails to be passed on as heritage, be it cheerful or vengeful. The medium of the ‘tradition
of  the oppressed’  only transmits  its  own broken mediacy,  rendering it  impossible to
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commemorate  it  in  a  linear  conventional  way.  Regarding the Peasants’  War and the
attempt  to  establish  an  artificial  counter-tradition  in  writings  such  as  Wilhelm
Zimmermann’s  History  of  the  Peasants’  War,  Benjamin  succinctly  notes:  “this  was  not
successful” (GS I, 1236). In more recent history, in the aftermath of the failed Spartacist
Uprising of 1919, Weimar Germany’s Communist Party (KPD) faced precisely this paradox:
how to commemorate a failure without fetishising the image of defeat? 
Revolutionsdenkmal or “Monument to the November Revolution,” Berlin, built in 1926, demolished in
1935, designed by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, commissioned for the KPD by Eduard Fuchs (Creative
Commons license: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H29710 / CC-BY-SA 3.0).
 
VI. Where the Past Was, There History Shall Be
35 Benjamin’s reference to the failed Spartacus uprising, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht, is itself written from a position of defeat. Insisting on the working class’s
“hatred and its spirit of sacrifice” (SW 4, 394), thesis XII calls for political vengeance
beyond the scope of symmetrical retribution. The revolutionary “image [Bild] of enslaved
ancestors”  (ibid.)  is  turned  against  the  social  democratic  “ideal  of  liberated
grandchildren” (ibid.). Such an image, Bild, presents only its political mediacy; it does not
illustrate or represent anything beyond its presentation.  It  is  itself  an image of class
struggle as “a fight for the crude and material things” (SW 4, 390). But how can such an
raw, unrefined image be framed, represented, memorialised?
36 After having initially favoured a more traditional proposal to erect a memorial for the
murdered revolutionaries of 1918/19, the German Communist Party (KPD) commissioned
the key member and later director of the Bauhaus, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, with the
construction  of  a  Revolutionsdenkmal  at  Berlin’s  Friedrichsfelde  cemetery,  where
Liebknecht  and Luxemburg were  buried. Without  going  into  details  of  Mies  van der
Rohe’s  daringly  abstract  proposal,  its  realisation,  inauguration  and  subsequent
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demolition by the Nazi government in 1935,44 it is worth noting that Mies van der Rohe’s
original plan for the Monument to the November Revolution from 1926 bore the inscription
Ich  bin,  Ich  war,  Ich  werde  sein (I  am,  I  was,  I  shall  be) 45 –  a  motto  taken from Rosa
Luxemburg’s  last  article,  “Die  Ordnung herrscht  in  Berlin”  (“Order  Rules  in  Berlin”)
published on January 14, 1919. Luxemburg, in turn, got this formulation from Ferdinand
Freiligrath’s poem “Die Revolution”,46 written in 1851 in the aftermath of the failed 1848
revolution. Her article concludes with the following passage:
“Order  prevails  in  Berlin!”  You  foolish  lackeys!  Your  “order”  is  built  on  sand.
Tomorrow the revolution will “rise up again, clashing its weapons,” and to your
horror it will proclaim with trumpets blazing: I was, I am, I shall be!47
37 This series of historical citations, repetitive invocations of failed revolutions, does not
declare final defeat or victory but insists on the temporal loop that the formula ‘I was, I
am, I shall be!’ introduces. What sounds like the linear succession of past, present, and
future,  is  fissured by both the insistence of  the ‘tradition of  the oppressed’,  and the
traumatic pressure of history’s repressed. Besides its peculiar temporality, the threefold
repetition  of  the  pronoun  ich,  I,  poses  the  question  of  who  is  speaking  here.  It  is
revolution itself that declares its structurally comical insistence. Moreover, Luxemburg’s
prosopopoeia is the only way to make the revolution ‘speak’, since there is no preexisting
speaker that could say ‘I, the revolution’. As we said before, the revolutionary/analytic
act of restoring the past’s crushed potentialities cannot be appropriated by a sovereign
subject of history, since the ich, ‘ego’, of the enunciation ‘I was, I am, I shall be’ is still
caught  in the spectral  net  of  es,  ‘id’  –  the trauma of  the past.  Working through the
unconscious non-symbolisable trauma of the past is a constructive and destructive act
that cannot rely on already established subjects. The revolutionary ego of ‘I was’ – the
collective subject of historical enunciation – has still to be constructed in order to allow
for the modality of ‘I shall be’. In this sense, Luxemburg’s formula subverts any attempt to
psychologise and individualise her revolutionary prosopopeia by attaching its unownable
gesture to the clichéd image of a pure martyr who heroically sacrificed her life in a ‘pure’
act.
38 With regard to Freud and Luxemburg, the task of Benjamin’s historical materialist is thus
to work through the collective unconscious of  the present and transform it  into the
actuality  of  the  collective  ego  of  revolutionary  politics.  As  is  well  known,  Freud
summarised the task of psychoanalysis according to this formula: “Where id was, there
ego shall be. It is a work of culture”.48 With Benjamin and Marx we might add: where the
crushed potentialities of the past were, there the history of the struggling, oppressed class
shall be. It is a work of historical politics, Geschichtspolitik. If the non-linear medium of
this work is the ‘tradition of the oppressed’, then we cannot fail to read the proper tense
of Luxemburg’s wager Ich war, ich bin, ich werde sein as Wo Es war, werde Ich gewesen sein.
The futur antérieur of ‘where id was, there ego will have been’ lays bare the temporal
structure of the political affect that Benjamin discovered in his ‘Theses’. In this sense, we
may also reread Marx’s call  to let the dead bury the dead.  The constructive work of
replacing ‘id’ by ‘ego’ will have been completed in the moment when the struggling and
oppressed class cheerfully destroys its ties to the past and historicises its specters as
history. This moment, however, is not an empirical date in the future but lies hidden in
the act of repeating the past in the present by changing their modal relation.
39 With these remarks we can understand how the epistemological task of seizing the past’s
true image relates to the ontological incompleteness of history. Only by grasping this
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temporal loop, by constructively working through the specters of the past, can we bury
history’s  undead.  This  burial,  however  destructive it  may  be,  does  not  serve  the
commemoration of dead generations but aims at changing the present in the moment of
recognising  the  true  image  in  the  past  –  an  image  that  suddenly,  seemingly  from
nowhere,  ‘speaks’  to the current oppressed in a situation of  danger.  Only this act  of
cognition,  channelled through the political  affect  of  the ‘tradition of  the oppressed’,
produces an authentically historical image (in contrast to historicism). Such a cognising
act intervenes in the ontology of what has been and might even betray the memory of past
generations of the downtrodden. After all, as we have seen, the Latin verb tradere (to pass
on, hand over) also connotes surrender and betrayal. In this sense, Benjamin’s historical
materialist  concept  of  history  does  not  serve  the  demands  of  history’s  dead  but
articulates on a more fundamental level the past’s undeadness and turns its specters
against each other. What is constructed in such a political/analytic act bears witness to a
profane striving for ‘messianic’ redemption – a redemption that completes, fulfils, and
repeats a past that has never happened in the first place. However, to take leave of one’s
past cheerfully does not mean to aim at a happy end of history, a Hegelian Erinnerung,
remembering and internalising of all of the spirits of the past.49 Rather, it means to admit
oneself to the danger of failure and failing again – not in order to fetishise the memory of
defeat but to change the parameters of the possible and to leave the realm of compulsively
repeating the past. In other words, only this modal change, while failing at repeating the
content of past failures, enters the realm of a transformative, revolutionary repetition of
history.  This  structure  of  transformative  repetition  also  applies  to  Benjamin’s  text.
Repeating Benjamin today does not mean to repeat his criticism of vulgar Marxism once
more in order to defeat an opponent that has long been defeated by the real history of
capitalism. Such a repetition would truly be farcical. Rather, repeating Benjamin aims at
taking leave of his past cheerfully by working through the undead specters of our past.
Instead of assimilating Benjamin to our times and reading our present into Benjamin’s
own historical  present,  our task is  rather to read a Benjaminian text that was never
written in the first place. Here, our historical distance to Benjamin’s time appears as a
connection through disconnection.  It  is  only  this  truly  historical discontinuity that  we
‘share’ with Benjamin and the ‘tradition of the oppressed’. Contrary to today’s culture
industry of commemoration and its customized production of memory without history,
Benjamin’s concept of the ‘tradition of the oppressed’ recalls the battleground of history
as a site of repressed possibilities of the present. For only the present can do justice to the
oppressed claims of history’s repressed. Such an act of justice, however, does not serve
the  demands  of  (un)official  politics  of  commemoration  and  does  not  aim  at  the
production of a ‘balanced’ representation of the past. Benjamin’s Geschichtspolitik does
justice to the past by repeating history as a comical sequence of failed attempts to break
with  history’s  compulsion  to  repeat.  This  sort  of  uneven  double  negation,  however,
remains negative:50 it even fails at producing the image of a proper failure: “‘no glory for
the victor, no sympathy for the defeated’” (GS I, 1237).51
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ABSTRACTS
As the proverb has it, ‘tradition is not to preserve the ashes but to pass on the flame’. Taking this
image as a starting point, this paper is interested in non-conservative concepts of tradition and
(dis)continuity. If the concept of tradition is normally associated with continuity, the concept of
tradition  poses  the  question  of  transmittability.  Is  there  a  continuous  medium  in  which
narrations, customs, rites or other material practices can be handed down from the past to the
present? If the transmittability of tradition is not a given, a commodified object, but subject to
historical change, the question of tradition and inheritance is inextricably linked to social and
political struggles. The concept of tradition, however, has mostly been theorized by conservative
thinkers.  In  this  vein,  traditional  historical  materialism  viewed  tradition  as  a  counter-
progressive retarding force. Walter Benjamin (1940), however, proposed a different concept of
historical time and tradition. History is not based on a progressive flow of “homogeneous, empty
time” but on disruptive constellations of the present and the past. The past is never fully gone; it
can never be fully historicized. The medium in which the present is connected to all lost causes
and struggles of those who literally and metaphorically lost their histories is called the “tradition
of the oppressed.” Paradoxically, this medium is a discontinuum – its texture is woven out of
struggles,  empty-spots  and  disconnected  elements  which  cannot  be  represented  in  one
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transmittable  image or  inscribed  into  one  multifaceted  yet  coherent  world-history.  If  the
“tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (Marx),
then the tradition of the oppressed will also haunt all attempts to repress it completely and erase
its  experience  in  the  linear  continuum of  “victor’s  history.”  But  how are  we  to  pass  on  an
oppressed tradition? How can the tradition of the oppressed be recalled, actualized and “worked
through”?
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